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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.-
In an action to determine adverse claims to real property,
a finding that a father executed a parol gift of an-eighty
pa Gift acre tract to his son, living with him at the time,
who went into possession thereof, and continued
to hold the same adversely for more than fifteen years before
the commencement of any action. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota holds that the presumption arising from the rela-
tionship of the parties that the possession of the son was
permissive, and continued for the benefit of the father, was
rebutted by proof of the parol gift, and that the adverse
possession was based thereon: Malone v. Malone, 93 N. W.
6o5. See Collins v. CIllcram (Minn.), go N. W. 364.
ANIMALS.-
In McChesney v. Wilson, 93 N. W. 627, the Supreme
Court of Michigan hohls that where a man killed another's
Rightte dog, which had killed his chickens, and con-
Kul tinually committed nuisances about his prem-
ises. the question whether he was justified in so doing was
for the jury, and that it was error for the court to direct a
verdict for the plaintiff. The case presents a brief review
of the authorities bearing upon the question of the right to
kill. an annoying dog, but does not make clear upon what
considerations the jury should act in reaching its verdict.
See in this conncction Hubbard v. Preston (Mich.), 51
N. W. 209. and note to the case in I3 L. R. A. 249.
ASSAULT WVITH INTENT TO KILL.
In Cosby v. Coinnonwealth, 72 S. W. xo89, the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky holds that only where the jury in a
Deadly prosecution for an assault with a deadly weapon
Weapon- with intent to kill, believe that the instrument
with which the defendant wounded another was such an in-
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strunient as was reas mably calculated to produce death .when
used by a person of detendant's strength and in the manner
in which it was used by him. would they be authorized to
find that such instrument was a deadly weapon within-the
meaning of the law.
BANKS.
Against the dissent of three judges the Court of Appeals
of New York holds in Taylor v. Comnnerciai Bank; 66 N.
Authority at E. 726. thlat in the absence of evidence of au-
Cashi er thorization. the cashier of a bank has no author-
itv by virtue of his po sition to make any representations on
helialf of the bank as to the solvency of a customer who is
one of its deltors, and the bank is not estopped by such
representations made by him to one whom the debtor of the
bank referred to the bank for information. Compare Bar-
wick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. P, 2 Exch. 259. cited
by the dissenting judges.
In Bryan v. First Nat. Bank of McKeesport, 54 Atl. 480,
the Supremne Court of Pennsylvania holds that where a bank
Check o receives from a depositor checks of another de-
Another positor. and gives credit for the same, it cannot,
Deposltor on failure of the drawer of the check to pay
the same. charge iff the credit, and on suit therefor allege
as a defence that the checks had been given in a gambling
transaction. Xor could. it object to an offer in evidence of
the checks. though they were unstamped. it having accepted
them in that condition and placed them to the credit of the
depositor. "The checks were not offered in evidence as the
basis of his claim, or as instruments upon which he had
sued." Compare Chartiers & Robinson Turnpike Co. v.
M1cVaniara, 72 Pa. 278,
BRIBERY..
A prisoner held under an illegal arrest cannot be con-
victed of offering to bribe an officer to allow him to escape:
Illegl Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Ex parte,
Arrest Richlrds, 72 S. A\. 838. Compare Moore v.
State. 69 S. W. 52I.
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CARRIERS.
Failure of a railr,,ad oampany to furnish every passenger
with a seat. and all.-,i\ing a passenger to board a car when
Negligence there is ni, seat for him is nat negligence per se:
petrS Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Houston &
T. C. R. Co. r. Bryvant, 72 S. W. 885.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.
InI Gak'estui, I. & S. A. R.3. Co. v. Contreras, 72 S. W.
io5i. the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds that in an
Action by action by a posthumous child for damages sus-
Posthumous tained by reason of his father's death, caused
Child by the defendant's negligence, the fact that the
mother and other children have recovered damages for such
death is immaterial: but in such action the defendant could
show the existence of the mother and five other children
who were entitled to damages for the deatfh of the father,
as bearing on the ertent of the present recovery.
DYING DECLARATIONS.
Statements in a dying declaration that deceased had never
nmade any threats against the defendant in his life; that de-
Admissibility ceased had not touched a drop of liquor for
over a month; that he knew no reason why the
defendant shot him, except the one he stated; that he did not
think the defendant was going to shoot him, because he had
never given him any cause to shoot himn, and that lie had
never had a quarrel with the (lefendant, are all held to be.
inaalnissible as referring to matters anterior to the killing,
and not a part of the res gestaw: Supreme Cqurt of Missouri
(Division No. 2) in State v. Parkcr, 72 S. W. 65o. See
State v. Draper, 65 'Mo. 340.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
A foreign corporation may site on a note given for the
price of machinery sold by it. where the transaction was one
Right to of interstate commerce. without having had a
Sue permit to do business in the state: Court of
Civic Appeals of Texas in Lane, etc. Co. v. City Electric, etc.
Co., 7 S.W. 425.
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INJUCTION.
The Curt of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Cumberland
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Loni.sv'ille toie Telephone
Telephone CU., 72 S. W. 4. that where a telephone com-
Wires pany had been granted a permit to erect its
poles on the same side of a street with the poles of another
company, having a prior, but not exclusive, franchise, and
the old conmpany, whenever the new one started to put in
poles of a certain height. immediately changed its own
poles, and made them of such a height as to prevent the new
company from proceeding, an injunction was issuable. It
is said that the two tefephone systems could not be operated
on the same horizontal plane.
INSURANCE.
A policy of insurance provided that it should be void
if any change other than the death of the insured should
Tran.ft take place in the title of the subject of the in-
ot Titl surance. A judgment had been rendered against
the insured, aind thereafter, without the insurance com-
pany's consent, he executed a dedd of the property insured,
in which his wife joined, to their son, intending thereby
to prevent the enforcement of the judgment against the
same. The deed was recorded, but no consideration was
paid by the son, and there was no change of possession.
Upon these facts the New York Supreme Court (Appellate
Division, Fourth Department) holds in Roseizstein v.
Traders' Insurance Co. of Chicago, 79 N. Y. Supp. 736,
that the deed constituted a "change of title" within the policy
rendering it unenforceable. Two judges dissent. Compare
Forward v. Insurance Co., 142 N. Y. 382.
A life policy called for the payment of the insurance in
ten annual installments commencing with the death of the
installments insured. The company refused to pay the first
installment when due. The Supreme Court of Texas holds
that. though an action on the policy put the company's lia-
bility on the contract in issue. judgment could not be ren-
dered against it- for the whole amount, with execution to
issun for the various installments as they fell due: New York
Life Ins. Co. v. English, 72 S.V. 8,
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NTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The question of the original package with reference to
cigarettes arises again in Cook v. Marshall Co., 93 N. W.
Original 372, where the Supreme Court-of Iowa holds
Package that where many boxes of cigarettes, each con-
taining ten cigarettes, are given absolutely loose to an ex-
press company,-by the manufacturer to transport to a per-
son in another state, each box will not be held to be an
"original package," though it does not appear that the ex-
press company used any receptacle in which to carry them.
The case is rested upon the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court, Austin v. Tenncssee, -179 U. S. 343.
The present case presents a slight but important advance
over that case since there it affirmatively appeared that the
express company used a basket for the packages of cigar-
ettes, while in this case it did not appear that any receptacle
whatever had been used for the small boxes. The principle
is adopted from the case referred to that to entitle to pro-
tection under the interstate commerce clause, the size of the
package must be such as is generally used in bona fide trans-
actions of the same kind.
JOINT TORT FEASORS.
Where one having a cause of action against several joint
tort feasors settles with some of them, and discharges them
&ttulnat. from liability, ihe others are released, though the
wit Part settlement provides that such others were not
discharged: Supreme Court of Michigan in McBride v.
Scott, 93 N. IV. 243. See, however, Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis.
138. The court arguing for the rule stated above says, -"To
hold that a reservation such as is here attempted saves
the right as to other tort feasors. would open the door for
the plaintiff in any case to acquire by successive settlements
more than just compensation; or as is said by Brown v.
Kencheloe, supra. [3 Cold. 193], 'the plaintiff in many
instances would operate upon the fears of the defendants,
and get from each full damages for the trespass com-
mitted.'"
JUDGES.
No action for damages can be maintained against a judge
of -a court of xecord for oppressively, maliciously and cor-
Judicial Acts ruptly entertaining a decree of disbarment
against an attorney, W1ebb v. Fisher .(Supreme Court of
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Tennessee), 72 S. XV. I o. See Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L. R.
Exch. 220.
LIBEL.
In an action for libel it is competent to prove, as against
a newspaper corporation. the ill-will or malice of the reporter
Newspopmt, Who wrote the article, for the purpose of recov-
nal ering punitive damages: New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, First Department) in Clifford
v. Press Pub. Co., 79 N. Y. Supp. 767. One judge dissents.
See Krug v. Pitass, 162 N. Y. x54.
NOTES.
In Mutual Beneflt Life Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 93 N. W. 134,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska holds that where a note
provides for 1o per cent interest after maturity, and an
Intersst, extension agreement is entered into between the
Extens on maker and holder, extending the time of pay-
ment, and providing for 6 per cent interest thereon during
the period of extensicn; the note will again draw interest at
io per cent. "The extension agreement," it is said, "'had
for its sole Purpose the postponement of the date of. maturity
of the original contract." See also North v. IValker's Ad-
n'r, 66 Mo. 453."
In Nebraska it is provided by statute that no one shall
practice medicine without a license. A note was given for
Illegal medical services rendered by an unlicensed prac-
Consideration titioner. The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds
in Citizens' State Bank of Newman Grove xr. Nore, 93 N.
XV. i6o. that such note might he recovered on in the hands
of a bona fide purchaser, notwithstanding the statutory pro-
hibition. The court lays down the general principle that a
statute, though rendering ai act criminal, will not in Ne-
braska be construed so as to make a negotiable instrument
void in the hands of a bona fide purchaser unless the act
specifically so declares. See and compare Shoddy v. Bank,
88 Tenn. 573.
PARTY WALL.
The Supreme Grnrt.of Nebraska holds in Cook v. Paul,
93 N- W. 430. that I promise by an adjoining lot owner io
Covn.ant the builder of a party wall to compensate him
ftir the use thereof is persIal to the prmisee and not a
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covenant running with the land; and where the builder's
lot is conveyed to one party, and the party wall agreement
assigned to'another, the latter is enfitled to the sum,.due
under such agreement. See Coe v. Hughcs, 54 N. Y. 444,
and-cases there cited, and also Maine v. Crunston, 98 Mass.
.PROPERTY.
In F. 1I. Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 66
N. E. 20., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Collecttng holds that where a company is engaged in com-
Information piling information as to pubilc improvements
as s6on after they are contemplated- as possible, and dis-
tributing such information to its customers, under an agree-
ment that they will use the reports in strict confidence, and
for their business only, to- enable them to take steps -to ob-
tain contracts, such c6mpany has a property right in the
information so compiled, which the courts will protect
against one who surreptitiously obtains such information
from a customer of the company and disseminates it to.
others.
RAILROADS.
A railorad company is not liable for injuries, caused by
a team taking fright at the ordinary operation of a train
Frightenlng upon its, road: Supreme Court of Nebraska in
Horan Hendricks v. Frcm ont, E. & M. V. R. Co., 93
N. W. 141. See Railroad Co. v. Roberts (Neb), 9z N. W.
707.
RECEIVERS.
The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) holds
in Chapmzan v. Atlantic Trust Co., 19 Fed. 257, that where
co"ts ot the costs and expenses of the management of
ReceivershIv mortgaged property by a receiver, authorized-
by the court, exceed the proceeds of the property when sold,
together with its earnings, and the court las expressly re-
tained jurisdiction over the sublject-matter and the parties
until the final settlement of the receiver's accounts, it bas
power on such settlement to render judgment for the de-
ficiency against the complainant, at whose instance the
receiver was appointed an(I continued and the expenses were
incurred. See Ephraim v. Bank, 129 Cak 589.
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A federal court has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for
a corLoration of another state. when by appearing and
Jurisdiction pleading to the merits. such corporation waives
of Federal its exemption from being sued out of the dis-
Courts trict of its donficife. and its action in- submitting
to the jurisdiction of the court cannot be overruled at the
instance of a stockholder or creditor, who was not a party
in the original suit, but who has been permitted to intervene:
U. S. Circuit Court (E. D., Louisiana) in Le-wis v. Ameri-
can Naval Stores Co., i 19 Fed. 391. See Trust Co. v.
McGcorge, 151 U. S. 129.
SALES.
If a contract for the sale of goods is procured by fraud-
ulent representations of the purchaser as to his solvency,
Fraud of the vendor has an election to affirm or rescind
Purchaser the contract. He may sue for the price of the
Election goods and also for dlamages for the fraud;
these remedies being consistent, and proceeding on the
theory of an affirmance of the contract. If. however, he
elects tt rescind the contract and recapture his goods, and
obtains in equity a decree adjudicating that the contract
is void on account of the fraud, he cannot thereafter bring
an action against the vendee for damages for the fraud,
such an action being founded on the procurement of the
contract. The rescission of the contract on the ground of
fraud is inconsistent with an action for deceit for being led
into making the contract: Supreme Court of Georgia in
Bacon v. Mifoody, 43 S. E. 482.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
In Shrover v. Smith, 54 Atl. 24, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania holds that an instrument purporting to be a will.
Parol Gift leaving land to one to w,:honl the same land had
been promised by paroI in return for services, was a suffi-
cient memorandnlm in writing within the statute of frauds,
and created a title which would defeat a voluntary convey-
ance.made h th'testator after the contract had been entered
into and before his death. See Smith v. Tint, 11-7 Pa. 3-41.
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SUNDAY LAVS.
The Supreme Court of Utah ill Slate v. Sapher, 71 Pac.
482, presents a good review of the constitutional aspect of
Constltution- Sunday legislation. It is there hel that an
altly exception from the general operation of the law
of hotels, hoarding houses, baths, restaurants, taverns, livery
stables, retail drug stores, and such manufacturing estab-
lishments as are usually-kept in constant operation, is based
upon a reasonable classification, and therefore permissible.
The case also decides that the keeping open of a barber
shop is not a "work of necessity" within the meaning of the
statutes, which generally excelt works of charity and neces-
sity. As to the constitutional aspect. see Ex parte Burke, 59
Cal. 6.
WAGERING CONTRACTS.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, adopting
the settled rule that money deposited in pursuance of a
Rcovery wagering agreement upon a rise or fall in the
of Depos., price of stocks may be recovered by the depos-
As lgnment itor from the depositary. whether the agreement
had been execited Or not, holds in Van Pet v. Scliaulk, 54
Afl. 437. that the depositor's right to such money is a chose
in action arising on an implied contract, and is assignable
at law.
WAYS.
In Thomas v. McCoy. 66 N. E. 700. the Appellate Court
of Indiana (Dvision No. i). holds that before a person
oNcesuity, entitled to a way (if necessity over the land of
Selection another can maintain an action to have it estab-
lished. he mnust show that he has requested the owner of the
land over which it is to pass to select a location for the
way: thait the owner has either failed to do so, or else has
(lone it in an unreast nable manner; and that. in case the
owner has failed to desigiate the route, the person seeking
to have the way established has selected a location for it.
hence where the complaint in an action to have a way of
necessity established, and the title thereto quieted, did not
contain a particular description of the route selected, it was
insufficient. See also Ritchey v. I Velsh.. 149 hid..214, 40
L. R. A. 1o5.
